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Abstract
 
This paper investigates: (1) the influence of risk 
checklists on software practitioner risk perception 
and decision-making, and (2) the influence of role 
(inside project manager vs. outside consultant) on 
software practitioner risk perception and decision-
making. Evidence on these points is presented based 
on a role playing experiment conducted with 128 
software practitioners.  Results show that a risk 
checklist helps software practitioners identify more 
risks than they would identify without the aid of a 
checklist. However, the role assigned to subjects did 
not seem to affect either their risk perception or 
behavior. The number of risks identified did not 
affect decision-making, but the use of a risk 
checklist appeared to shape subjects’ perceptions of 
which risks were salient in the scenario. 
Interestingly, subjects using a checklist were able to 
identify more seeded risks in the scenario, but they 
also identified more unseeded risks. Implications for 
research and practice are discussed. 
. 
1. Introduction 
 
A substantial portion of software projects end in 
failure. In an IBM Consulting Group survey of 24 
leading companies that had developed large 
distributed systems, 55% of the projects cost more 
than expected, 68% overran their schedules, and 
88% had to be substantially redesigned [1]. 
According to the Standish report [2]: from 1994 to 
2000, although the success rate of projects increased 
from 16% to 28%, the failed and challenged projects 
still account for 72% of all projects. One particularly 
disturbing form of failure is escalating projects in 
which managers become committed to a failing 
course of action despite negative information about 
the project and its prospects for success [3]. 
Software risk management has been promoted as 
one approach to reduce project failure [4], [5]. The 
advocates of risk management claim that if software 
practitioners perceive the risks associated with a 
particular project, they will be less willing to 
commit themselves and their organizations to failing 
courses of action and hence make better decisions 
concerning project continuation.  
There are various tools for software risk 
management, including risk lists, risk-action lists, 
risk-strategy models, and risk-strategy analyses [6]. 
The simplest form is the risk list that software 
practitioners can use to quickly identify and assess 
risks in their projects. Such risk checklists contain a 
set of generic risk items with brief descriptions that 
help identify possible sources of risk and develop 
awareness of the specific risks associated with a 
project. The expectation is that checklists will help 
software practitioners identify more risks and make 
better continuation decisions.  
The concept that different stakeholders can 
perceive software projects in different ways is also 
well established in the literature [7]. Keil et al [8], 
have demonstrated, for example, that users and 
project managers differ in terms of their project risk 
perceptions. Moreover, the literature on software 
project escalation suggests that project managers 
have a tendency to be blind on certain risks because 
of conflicts of interest between their personal 
devotion to the project and suggestions to stop or 
radically restructure the project. This suggests that 
people in the role of outsiders can be brought in to 
assess project risks from a more detached 
perspective. This suggestion is based on the 
assumption that project outsiders as compared to 
project insiders will identify more risks and make 
better continuation decisions. 
There have been a number of studies offering a 
variety of checklists for software projects [4] [9] 
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evidence on how such checklists influence software 
practitioner perception and decision-making. In 
addition, though it is fair to assume that outsiders 
would see more risks than insiders, we found no 
empirical studies in the literature of the influence of 
outsiders on risk perception and behavior. Thus, the 
objective of this research was to address these gaps 
in our understanding by investigating: 
1.  The influence of risk checklists on software 
practitioner risk perception and decision-
making. 
2.  The influence of role (specifically the 
inside project manager vs. an outside 
consultant) on software practitioner risk 
perception and decision-making. 
We have studied these issues through a role 
playing experiment [12] in which the participating 
software practitioners were confronted with project 
scenarios and asked to assess risks and make 
continuation decisions. 
The next section presents relevant literature in 
the area of software risk management, especially 
focusing on risk checklists and the role of outsiders. 
Following this, we present our research questions 
and hypotheses and then introduce the research 
approach used to collect and analyze the data. 
Finally, we present and discuss the results from our 
experiment along with implications and limitations 
of the research. 
 
2. Software Risk Management 
 
Software risk management is a major stream of 
contribution to the project management literature 
within the information systems discipline. 
Advocates claim that actions can be taken to reduce 
the chance of failure by identifying and analyzing 
threats to a project [1]. Software risk management 
attempts to identify, address, and eliminate risk 
items before they become threats to a project. 
Practitioners are generally advised to follow two 
stages: risk assessment and risk control [4]. 
Software risk assessment requires identification of 
the risk items (factors) that must be controlled to 
keep the project on track [4] [13] [10]. 
Subsequently, software practitioners apply various 
risk resolution tactics to address and control the 
identified risks [4] [13]. 
Theoretically, a risk is composed of two 
components: (1) the likelihood that a loss will occur, 
and (2) the significance or magnitude associated 
with the possible loss [4] [14] [15]. The ways in 
which the two risk components are assessed vary 
between approaches. At one extreme are highly 
quantitative approaches that seek to arrive at 
probabilistic estimates of risk and absolute 
magnitudes of potential losses [4]. At the other 
extreme are purely subjective assessments of risk 
[16] which may or may not be expressed in numeric 
terms (e.g., a 5-point scale for the likelihood of a 
risk materializing) as the involved practitioners 
consider, assess, and prioritize risks without use of 
formal metrics. Independent of which approach 
practitioners adopt, risk assessments may affect both 
their perception of a project and their subsequent 
decision about whether and how to continue [7]. 
 
2.1. Risk checklist 
 
Risk identification is an important part of risk 
assessment concerned with finding risks that might 
influence a project [17]. A risk checklist provides 
generic risk items that practitioners can use as a 
vocabulary to identify and classify risky events and 
states in their projects [7]. Checklists should ideally 
offer comprehensive coverage of relevant risk items 
and thereby help software practitioners effectively 
scan their environment [7] to determine project 
specific risks [17].  
Various risk checklists have been proposed in the 
literature to facilitate risk identification. Table 1 
offers a summary of some of the most frequently 
referenced.  
Boehm [4] offered a top-ten checklist of risks on 
software projects based on a survey of experienced 
project managers. Heemstra and Kusters [17] 
combined literature studies with practical experience 
to develop a checklist consisting of 36 risk factors 
grouped into 9 categories. Moynihan surveyed 14 
experienced application developers in Ireland and 
identified 21 construct themes which could be 
related to risk. Ropponen and Lyytinen [9] 
developed a questionnaire based on Boehm’s [4] 
checklist and extracted 6 risk components based on 
a survey of project managers covering nearly 1100 
projects. Schmidt et al. [10] conducted a Delphi 
study with experienced project managers in Hong 
Kong, Finland, and the United States. They 
identified 53 unique risk items which they grouped 
into 14 categories. Barki et al. [14] developed an 
instrument to measure software project risks based 
on a literature review. Using a survey, they 
identified a final set of 23 risk variables in 5 
categories. Based on a comprehensive review of the 
literature and a rigorous instrument development 
process, Wallace and Keil [11] identified 6 
dimensions of software project risk and introduced a 
model showing how these relate to project 
performance. Extensive efforts have in this way 
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aggregating risk items and categories into 
comprehensive lists that can inform software 
practitioners.  
 
Table 1 Risk Checklists in the Literature 
Checklist Risk  items  Sources 
Boehm 
1991 
10 risk items  Survey of experienced 
project managers 
Barki, 
Rivard et 
al. 1993 
23 risk items; 5 
categories 
Systematic literature 
review  
Heemstra 
& Kusters 
1996 
36 risk items 9 
categories 
Literature combined 
with experiences 
Moynihan 
1997 
21 construct 
themes relating 
to risk 
Interviews with 14 
application developers
Ropponen 
& 
Lyytinen 
2000 
6 risk items  Survey (self reported 
data) of 83 project 
managers covering 
nearly 1100 projects 
Schmidt et 
al. 2001 
53 risk items; 14 
categories 
International Delphi 
study with 
experienced project 
managers 
Wallace, 
Keil, and 
Rai 2004 
6 dimensions of 
risk 
Comprehensive 
literature review and 
rigorous instrument 
development process 
with project managers.
 
2.2. Role of outsiders 
 
Collaboration with outsiders has generally been 
proposed as a way for software practitioners to 
critically reflect on intermediate results or project 
status. Freedman and Weinberg [18] provide 
guidance on how to select members of review teams 
that help assure the quality of project deliverables. 
They emphasize that it is important to obtain “a 
broad enough view by including people outside the 
manager’s span of control” (p. 23). In addition, they 
provide the reasons why it is so important to include 
such outsiders in the review team. These include (p. 
25): 
•  You learn from them. 
•  You get less biased evaluation from them. 
•  You have a better chance of discovering 
problems of an organization-wide nature. 
•  Your reviews will be more interesting 
making more colleagues interested in the 
outcome. 
Parnas and Clements [19] support this position 
claiming that “regular review of the project’s 
progress by outsiders is essential to good 
management.” 
In relation to the particular area of project 
escalation and bad news reporting, Keil and Robey 
[20] interviewed 42 information systems auditors 
and asked them to share their experiences as 
evaluators of troubled projects. They found that both 
internal and external auditors can be reluctant to 
“blow the whistle” and report problems (risks) on a 
project, but they noted that “internal auditors 
exposing project difficulties assumed greater 
personal risk than external auditors, because they 
were more dependent on the outcome than their 
external auditor counterparts” ([21], p. 90). Keil and 
Robey [20] suggest that audit staffs are likely to be 
“more effective when separated organizationally 
from the authority of those whose projects are being 
monitored.” By extension, it is reasonable to 
presume that a consultant who is outside the 
organization would have less role conflict in 
delivering bad news than the project manager inside 
the organization and would therefore be in a better 
position both to identify risks objectively and to 
make sound decisions. This is consistent with [22], 
suggesting that engaging outsiders in the assessment 
of a project can be a helpful way to deal with 
escalation of commitment when the outsiders are 
given the specific mandate of making a project 
continuation decision.  
 
3. Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 
There are good reasons to expect that the use of 
checklists and the role of the assessor (the internal 
project manager vs. an outside consultant) will 
affect both the identification of risks and the 
decision of whether or not to continue a project. To 
date, however, there have been no empirical studies 
of which we are aware that have investigated 
whether checklists and roles influence the way 
practitioners perceive software risks and make 
continuation decisions. This study is therefore 
designed to address the following research 
questions: 
•  What is the influence of risk checklists on 
software practitioner risk perception and 
decision-making? 
•  What is the influence of outside 
practitioners on software risk perception 
and decision-making? 
Theoretically, the purpose of a checklist is to 
provide a comprehensive risk profile and bring 
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From this perspective, a checklist is expected to help 
practitioners identify more risk factors than they 
would otherwise be able to identify without the aid 
of such a tool. Hence, we state the following 
hypothesis:  
 
H1)  Software practitioners who use a risk 
checklist will identify more risks than those 
who do not use a checklist. 
 
The literature on project escalation and bad news 
reporting lends support for the notion that insiders 
can become so close to a project that they lose their 
ability to be objective. Insiders are more likely than 
outsiders to become overly attached to a project 
which can blind them to the risks involved. From 
this perspective, someone without a vested interest 
in the project (i.e., an outsider) will make more 
unbiased assessments of risk. This leads to two 
additional hypotheses about the role of outsiders: 
 
H2a) Software practitioners with an outsider role 
will perceive more risks than software 
practitioners with an insider role. 
H2b)  Software practitioners with an outsider role 
will exhibit more risk-averse behavior than 
software practitioners with an insider role. 
 
Further, prior research has shown an inverse 
relationship between risk perception and risk 
behavior [15] suggesting that if risk checklists can 
heighten risk perceptions, they will result in more 
risk-averse behavior. If H1 above is confirmed and 
risk checklists allow for the identification of more 
risks, it is reasonable to assume that they will reduce 
the tendency to continue a troubled project. Hence, 
we state the following hypothesis: 
 
H3)  Software practitioners identifying more risks 
will exhibit more risk-averse behavior. 
 
Finally, in a conceptual paper on software risk, [7] 
explore the idea that different risk identification 
tools emphasize certain types of risk and can thus 
shape attention in different ways. While attractive in 
theory, this notion has not been subjected to an 
empirical test. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to 
assume that checklists will result in some amount of 
attention-shaping. Specifically, software 
practitioners using a checklist may be prone to 
identify certain risks that they would not otherwise 
see. Thus, we state the following hypothesis:  
 
H4)  Risk checklists will shape attention so that 
software practitioners using a checklist will be 
apt to perceive risks differently than software 
practitioners who do not use the checklist. 
 
4. Research Approach 
 
A laboratory experiment in which an 
“intervention is deliberately introduced to observe 
its effects” [23], was chosen as the most appropriate 
methodology for investigating our research 
questions and hypotheses. Experiments provide a 
controlled environment and high level of internal 
validity and are widely used to evaluate theory or to 
test hypotheses [24].  
To enhance the external validity of our study, the 
subjects were drawn from practitioners in the IT 
development industry. The subject pool consisted of 
four companies ranging from medium to large, 
developing a variety of applications including 
hospital, government, financial and communication 
systems. Company A is the IT department of a large 
bank (2000 IT employees); Company B is a 
software and IT system provider for government 
authorities (2500 employees); Company C is a 300 
person software organization that develops software 
communications systems for the military and 
medical records systems for hospitals; Company D 
is a software house developing hospital information 
systems (280 employees).  
We contacted a manager of each company and 
asked for their assistance in recruiting software 
practitioners for our study with more than 1 year of 
software development experience. 149 software 
practitioners volunteered to participate in the study, 
yielding 128 usable responses.
3 The demographic 
profile of subjects is shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 Experiment Subjects  
Demographic Information 
Age 
Experience 
(Years) 
Number of 
Projects  
Mean 35.96 Mean 9.77  Mean  13.53 
Std. 
Dev. 7.25 
Std. 
Dev. 7.64 
Std. 
Dev. 23.99 
 
A customized website was developed to conduct 
the experiment and to collect data. The experiment 
employed a two by two (2x2) factorial design. The 
first factor was the presence of a risk checklist; the 
                                                 
3 Twenty one cases were dropped from subsequent 
analysis because the subjects failed a manipulation 
check (see Appendix 2.C) designed to test whether 
they had assumed the role that was assigned to them 
in the scenario (project manager or outside 
consultant). 
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insider (project manager) or outsider (external 
consultant). Subjects were randomly assigned to one 
of the four treatment groups. For the risk checklist 
treatment groups, we used the 14 risk categories 
reported by Schmidt et al. [10] as the basis for 
creating a risk checklist that subjects could use to 
indicate the presence or absence of various risk 
factors. 
In the experiment, the subjects were asked to 
read a scenario and play the role of either the project 
manager or an external consultant. Two parallel 
versions of the scenario (see Appendix 1) were 
developed differing only in the role assigned to the 
subject. The scenario illustrated a dilemma 
associated with an online banking system developed 
by an in-house IT department of a bank. The online 
banking system was approaching the planned release 
date when the testing team found that the system 
lacked a key feature of the functionality originally 
specified. The subjects were asked to assess the 
risks and make a decision on whether the system 
should be released as scheduled or delayed for 
further testing. The scenario was seeded with seven 
risks taken from the adopted risk checklist [10].  
After reading the scenario, subjects were asked 
to identify the potential risks. Subjects assigned to 
the “risk checklist” treatment were presented two 
consecutive web pages with 7 risk items on each 
that could be selected with radio buttons (see 
Appendix 2.A). Subjects assigned to the “no risk 
checklist” treatment were asked to enter as many 
risks as they could identify in the scenario by typing 
them into a text box (see Appendix 2.B). After 
subjects finished identifying risks, a summary of 
their input was presented to them and they could 
iteratively modify their risk identification. Finally, 
the subjects were asked to make a decision (on an 8 
point scale) either to continue with or delay the 
previously scheduled launch (see Appendix 2.C). 
Since subjects in the “no risk checklist” 
treatment groups could enter risk items freely, their 
responses had to be coded in order to meaningfully 
compare their results with those of subjects in the 
risk checklist treatment groups. In addition to the 
original fourteen risk categories of the risk checklist 
[10], an “other” category was added to capture any 
suggested risks that did not fit neatly into one of the 
fourteen categories. Two coders independently 
analyzed the risk items generated by the subjects in 
the “no risk checklist” treatment groups and coded 
them into the risk factors specified by the risk 
checklist. Then a panel discussion with two experts 
on software project risk was held after the initial 
coding was completed. The panelists (which 
included the two coders and the two experts) 
examined and discussed each instance in which the 
two coders disagreed on the coding of an item. 
Where disagreements existed, coding guidelines 
were refined to aid in recoding these items. The two 
coders iteratively coded in this fashion supported by 
panel meetings until consensus was reached on the 
coding of all subject responses. 
 
5. Result and Discussion 
 
In the following, we present the results from the 
experiment structured around the four hypotheses. 
 
5.1. Checklists and number of risks 
identified 
 
Hypothesis 1 states that software practitioners 
who use a risk checklist are expected to identify 
more risks than those who do not use a checklist. 
Table 3 lists the descriptive statistics for number of 
risks identified by all subjects and the final decision 
they made.  
 
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics 
  With Risk Checklist  Without Risk 
Checklist 
Response 34  Response 28 
Num. of 
Risks 
7.765 
(2.375) 
Num. of 
Risks 
3.964 
(1.138) 
In-
sider 
Final 
decision 
2.529 
(1.656) 
Final 
decision 
2.893 
(1.950) 
Response 30  Response 36 
Num. of 
Risks 
8.167 
(2.23) 
Num. of 
Risks 
4.167 
(1.920) 
Out-
sider 
Final 
decision 
3.100 
(1.918) 
Final 
decision 
2.472 
(.1230) 
 
This table shows that subjects who used the risk 
checklist identified significantly more risks than 
subjects who did not use one (for insiders, the mean 
number of risks identified were 7.8 vs. 4.0; for 
outsiders, the mean number of risks identified were 
8.2 vs. 4.2). Figure 1 shows the frequency counts for 
identification of individual risk items.  
Risk Item Frequency Diagram
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Figure 1.  Risk Item Frequency Related 
to Use of Checklist (14 first from 
checklist; 15
th “other”) 
 
Proceedings of the 39th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences - 2006
5In 11 out of 15 individual risk categories (14 
from the checklist plus the “other” category), the 
“with risk checklist” groups identified more risks 
than the “without risk checklist” groups. This was 
confirmed with a two-way ANOVA with interaction 
shown in Table 4 (sig. = .000 and F = 120.97).   
Results indicated no significant interaction effect, 
allowing for meaningful interpretation of the main 
effects.  There was a significant main effect of the 
checklist on the number of risks identified.   
Therefore, H1 was supported. 
 
5.2. Assessment role, number of risks 
identified, and decision 
 
Hypothesis 2 has two parts. Hypothesis 2a states 
that outsiders are expected to perceive more risks 
than insiders. Table 3 shows that outsiders identified 
slightly more risks than insiders (8.2 vs. 7.8 for the 
“with checklist” groups; 4.2 vs. 4.0 for the “without 
checklist” groups). The difference, however, was 
not significant. This was confirmed with a two-way 
ANOVA showing no significant main effect on role 
on the number of risks identified (Table 4; sig. = 
.396 and F = .726).  
 
Table 4 Two-Way ANOVA for  
Number of Risks Identified 
Source Type  III 
Sum of 
Squares 
Df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Corrected 
Model 
483.720(a) 3  161.24  40.453  .000 
Intercept 4586.57  1  4586.57  1150.706  .000 
WITHTOOL 482.002  1  482.002 120.927  .000 
ROLE 2.893  1  2.893  .726  .396 
WITHTOOL 
* ROLE 
.316 1  .316  .079  .779 
Error  494.249  124  3.986       
Total  5610.00  128          
Corrected 
Total 
977.969  127          
Note: 1) R Squared = .495 (Adjusted R Squared = 
.482). 2) Dependent variable: number of risks 
identified. Independent variables: ROLE 
(insider vs. outsider) and WITHTOOL (with 
a risk checklist vs. without a risk checklist).  
 
Figure 2 visually shows that there were no major 
differences in the risks identified by insiders and 
outsiders. We also ran a series of ANOVAs for each 
of the risk factors in the checklist, and found that 
with the exception of risk factor #5 (“scope risk”) 
[10], there were no significant differences between 
insiders and outsiders (sig. = .067 and F = 3.416). 
Thus, hypothesis 2a was not supported. 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 01 11 21 31 41 5
Outsider
Insider
 
Figure 2 Risk Item Frequency Related 
to Role (14 first from checklist;  
15
th “other”) 
 
Hypothesis 2b concerns the effect of role (insider 
vs. outsider) on decision-making. Our expectation 
was that outsiders are less likely to release the 
software as scheduled. Another two-way ANOVA, 
this time examining the effect of role and tool on the 
final decision (see Table 5), was conducted to test 
this hypothesis.  
 
Table 5 Two-Way ANOVA for  
Final Decision 
Source Type  III 
Sum of 
Squares 
Df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Corrected 
Model 
8.608(a) 3  2.869 1.008  .391 
Intercept 957.553  1  957.553  336.535 .000 
WITHTOOL.178 1  .178  .063  .803 
ROLE .553 1  .553  .195  .660 
WITHTOOL 
* ROLE 
7.783 1 7.783  2.735  .101 
Error  352.821  124  2.845       
Total  1313.000  128          
Corrected 
Total 
361.430  127          
Note: 1) R Squared = .024 (Adjusted R Squared = 
.000). 2) Dependent variable: Final decision. 
Independent variables: ROLE (insider vs. 
outsider) and WITHTOOL (with a risk 
checklist vs. without a risk checklist). 
 
Once again, there was no significant interaction 
of tool and role, allowing for meaningful 
interpretation of any main effects. There was no 
significant main effect of subjects’ role on their final 
decision. This is consistent with the descriptive 
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supported. 
Although the assessment roles (insiders vs. 
outsiders) of software practitioners were expected to 
affect both risk perceptions and decision-making, 
we found that subjects assigned to the outsider role 
did not identify more risks than insiders or make 
more risk-averse decisions. One possible 
explanation for this finding is that 110 out of 128 
respondents had a working title of either software 
developer or project manager. For these subjects, it 
may have been difficult to play the role of an outside 
consultant even though they passed the manipulation 
check and were aware of the role they were 
supposed to play. 
 
5. 3. Number of risks identified and decision  
 
Hypothesis 3 states that software practitioners 
identifying more risks are expected to exhibit more 
risk-averse behavior (i.e., they would be less likely 
to release the software as scheduled). In order to test 
hypothesis 3, we ran a linear regression on the final 
decision and number of risks identified. No 
significant relationship was identified (Adjusted R 
square = .000, F = 1.027, and sig. = .313). Contrary 
to our hypothesis, subjects who identified more risks 
were no more risk-averse than the subjects who 
identified fewer risks. It appears that regardless of 
the treatment condition, most subjects favored delay. 
The average score of subjects’ decisions was 2.7 (on 
an 8 point scale where lower numbers signify a 
greater inclination to delay the project). This 
indicates that subjects may not have needed a risk 
checklist to appreciate that it would be risky to 
release as scheduled. In order to explore this further, 
a drill-down analysis was conducted at the level of 
individual risk items. 
A stepwise regression was performed to analyze 
the effect of each individual risk item on the 
decisions subjects made (see Table 6). Only two of 
the 15 risks studied (including the “other” category) 
were found to significantly influence the decision: 
“relationship management” (#3) and “technology” 
(#12). This implies that these two risks were the 
dominant drivers in terms of the subjects’ decision-
making. So, although the experimental scenario was 
seeded with many different risk items, some clearly 
carried more weight in terms of the decision to 
release as scheduled or to delay the project. This 
suggests that hypothesis 3 was too simplistic. It may 
not be the relative frequency of risks identified that 
influence decision-making as much as whether key 
risks are identified or not. 
 
Table 6 Stepwise Regression Model for 
Final Decision and Number of Risks 
Model   Sum of 
Squares 
Df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
1 Regression 19.48  1  19.48  7.18 .008(a)
   Residual  341.95  126 2.71       
   Total  361.43  127         
2 Regression 32.25  2  16.13  6.12 .003(b)
   Residual  329.18  125 2.63       
   Total  361.43  127         
Note: 1) Predictors: (Constant), RISK3. 2) 
Predictors: (Constant), RISK3, RISK12. 3) 
Dependent Variable: Final Decision 
 
Our data (Table 7) suggest that the key risks in 
this scenario were “relationship management” (# 3) 
and “technology” (#12) risks and these particular 
risks were identified with the same frequency 
regardless of the treatment condition to which 
subjects were assigned. 
 
Table 7 Frequency Count of  
Risk 3 and Risk 12 
  Risk 3  Risk 12 
Insider/Outsider 32/38  45/53 
With/Without Checklist  34/36  49/49 
 
5.4. Checklists and attention shaping 
 
Hypothesis 4 states that the use of a risk checklist 
is expected to shape software practitioner attention 
(i.e., cause them to focus on certain types of risks). 
In this study, we intentionally seeded the scenario 
with seven risks corresponding to the following risk 
items in the checklist (#1, 3, 6, 7, 8, 11, and 12). We 
ran independent samples t-tests on seeded risks and 
non-seeded risks respectively (Table 8 and Table 9).   
For the seeded risks comparison, Levene’s test 
for equality of variances yielded p > .05 for the F 
score on this test, which means that equal variances 
can be assumed.  For the unseeded risks comparison, 
Levene’s test yielded p < .05, which means that 
equal variances cannot be assumed.   
Results showed that subjects who used the risk 
checklist identified more seeded risks as well as 
non-seeded risks relative to subjects who did not use 
the checklist. This suggests that a risk checklist can 
have a significant influence on software practitioner 
risk perception.  
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for Seeded Risks 
 
 Levene's Test for Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of 
Means 
 SEEDED 
   F  Sig.  t  Df  Sig. 
Equal variances 
assumed  .009  .923  -5.143  126  .000
  
Equal variances 
not assumed 
 
   -5.143  125.9  .000
Note: 0 = Without_tool_seeded: number of seeded 
risks identified by the subjects who did not use 
risk checklist.  
1 = With_tool_seeded: number of seeded risks 
identified by the subjects who used risk 
checklist. 
 
Table 9 Independent Samples T-Test  
for Non-Seeded Risks 
Group  N  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
0  64  .67  .818  .102
1  64  3.34  1.439  .180
 
 Levene's Test for Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of 
Means 
 NON-
SEEDED 
   F  Sig.  t  Df  Sig.  
Equal variances 
assumed  13.7  .000  -12.92  126  .000 
  
Equal variances 
not assumed 
 
   -12.92  99.84  .000 
Note:  0 = Without_tool_non-seeded: number of non-
seeded risks identified by the subjects who did 
not use risk checklist.  
1= With_tool_non-seeded: number of non-
seeded risks identified by the subjects who 
used risk checklist. 
In the case of the seven seeded risks, it is clear 
that the checklist helped subjects to identify more 
seeded risks; but even without the benefit of a 
checklist nearly half of the seeded risks were 
identified on average. 
In the case of the unseeded risks, an even more 
interesting pattern emerges. Here, we see that 
subjects using a checklist identified an average of 
more than three risks that were not seeded into the 
scenario. In contrast, subjects not using a checklist 
identified less than one unseeded risk on average. 
This suggests that in the absence of a risk checklist, 
software practitioners are better able to distinguish 
between risks that are really there and risks that are 
not. In other words, it appears that the checklist 
prompts software practitioners to identify risks that 
are not present in the scenario. One explanation for 
this is that the risk checklist makes it easier to 
identify risks and practitioners may be inclined to 
check off items that they would not take the time to 
write down in the “without checklist” treatment. 
This finding suggests that the checklist creates a 
certain bias by confronting software practitioners 
with specific risks that may or may not be present in 
the scenario. In the absence of a checklist, 
practitioners are not confronted with any risks that 
are not present in the scenario. Further, using a 
checklist may create a “mindless” approach to the 
task of risk identification inviting software 
practitioners to put less thought into the exercise. 
 
6. Limitations 
 
While experiments are often criticized for 
achieving internal control at the expense of external 
validity, in this study we tried to achieve the best of 
both worlds by combining a controlled experiment 
with experienced software practitioners as subjects. 
We consider this a definite strength of the research 
design. 
However, one limitation of the study is that role 
playing experiments are inherently weak in terms of 
the strength of manipulations. In this experiment, 
the role manipulation might not have been strong 
enough to produce a sufficiently realistic effect. 
Thus, while it is tempting to conclude that the risk 
assessor’s role does not influence risk perception or 
behavior, it may be premature to draw such a 
conclusion given the difficulty involved in 
manipulating software practitioners to adopt the 
assigned role. In an organizational setting, we would 
expect that the role of practitioners might have 
effects that we were unable to observe within the 
confines of a laboratory experiment. A related 
limitation is that the composition of our subject pool 
was heavily oriented toward internal developers 
rather than external consultants.  
Group  N  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
0  64  3.38  1.374  .172
1  64  4.61  1.341  .168
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8Another limitation is that the key risks that drove 
decision-making on the project might have been 
ones that were obvious enough for the participating 
software practitioners to identify without a checklist. 
From this perspective, it is difficult to draw firm 
conclusions from our study about the impact of a 
risk checklist on decision-making. Further research 
is needed in order to explore whether such a 
relationship exists. Also, in this study we only 
examined one type of risk identification tool—a risk 
checklist [10]. Additional research is needed to 
examine whether other types of risk identification 
tools like risk-action lists, risk-strategy models, and 
risk-strategy analyses [6] would produce similar 
findings.  
 
7. Implications and Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we studied the influence of a risk 
checklist and assessment role on software 
practitioner risk perception and decision-making. 
The results suggest that a risk checklist helps 
software practitioners identify more risks than they 
would identify without the aid of a checklist. The 
role assigned to subjects did not seem to affect 
either their risk perception or behavior. The number 
of total risks identified did not affect decision-
making, but the identification of certain key risks 
associated with the scenario did appear to influence 
decision-making. Interestingly, the use of a risk 
checklist appeared to shape subjects’ perceptions of 
which risks were salient in the scenario. 
Specifically, practitioners using a risk checklist were 
able to identify more of the seeded risks in the 
scenario, but they also identified more unseeded 
risks (i.e., risks not intended to be in the scenario). 
For software project risk researchers and 
practitioners, this study confirms the potential value 
of risk checklists in helping to identify risks that 
might otherwise go unnoticed. From an attention 
shaping standpoint, however, risk checklists can be 
both good and bad. While checklists may help 
practitioners to identify risks that are there, it can 
also prompt them to see risks that are not really 
there. To the extent that the risk checklist is not 
comprehensive or is biased toward certain risks and 
away from others, this can impact risk perception, as 
the checklist serves as attention-shaping 
mechanisms. 
In a more speculative vein, we suggest that risk 
checklists are most likely to be of value in situations 
where the risks present are of such a subtle nature 
that without some form of prompting, they might go 
unnoticed. However, the guidance that comes with a 
risk checklist clearly has its costs. Software 
practitioners using checklists should be aware that 
they may result in a heightened sensitivity to risks in 
general, including risks that may not be present in a 
given situation. On the one hand, this would seem to 
be a bad thing in that practitioner’s selectivity 
towards identifying actual versus imaginary risks is 
lowered when they use a checklist. On the other 
hand, it is clear that the checklist does help 
practitioners identify more actual risks and it may 
not be an altogether bad thing if it heightens their 
overall sensitivity to risks. 
 
8. References 
 
[1] Gibbs, W.W., Software's Chronic Crisis. 
Scientific American, 1994. 271(3): p. 86-95. 
[2] Extreme Chaos. 2001, Standish Group. 
[3] Staw, B.M., The Escalation of Commitment To a 
Course of Action. Academy of Management 
Review, 1981. 6(4): p. 577-587. 
[4] Boehm, B.W., Software Risk Management: 
Principles and Practices. IEEE Software, 1991. 
8(1): p. 32-41. 
[5] Ropponen, J. and K. Lyytinen, Can Software 
Risk Management Improve System Development: An 
Exploratory Study. European Journal of Information 
Systems, 1997. 6: p. 41-50. 
[6] Iversen, J., L. Mathiassen, and P.A. Nielsen, 
Managing Risks in Software Process Improvement: 
An Action Research Approach. MIS Quarterly, 
2004. 28(3): p. 395-433. 
[7] Lyytinen, K., L. Mathiassen, and J. Ropponen, 
Attention Shaping and Software Risk - A categorical 
Analysis of Four Classical Risk Management 
Approaches. Information Systems Research, 1998. 
9(3): p. 233-255. 
[8] Keil, M., A. Tiwana, and A. Bush, Reconciling 
User and Project Manager Perceptions of IT 
Project Risk: A Delphi Study. Information Systems 
Journal, 2002. 12(2): p. 103-119. 
[9] Ropponen, J. and K. Lyytinen, Components of 
Software Development Risk: How to Address Them? 
A Project Manager Survey. IEEE Transactions on 
Software Development, 2000. 26(2): p. 98-112. 
[10] Schmidt, R., et al., Identifying software project 
risks: An international Delphi study. Journal of 
Management Information Systems, 2001. 17(4): p. 
5-36. 
Proceedings of the 39th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences - 2006
9[11] Wallace, L. and M. Keil, Software Project 
Risks and their Impact on Outcomes. 
Communications of the ACM, 2004. 47(4): p. 68-73. 
[12] Galliers, R.D. and F.F. Land, Viewpoint: 
choosing appropriate information systems research 
methodologies. CACM, 1987. 30(11): p. 901 - 902. 
[13] Fairley, R., Risk Management for Software 
Projects. IEEE Software, 1994: p. 57-67. 
[14] Barki, H., S. Rivard, and J. Talbot, Toward an 
Assessment of Software Development Risk. Journal 
of Management Information Systems, 1993. 10(2): 
p. 203-225. 
[15] Keil, M., Wallace, L., Turk, D., Dixon-Randall, 
G., and Nulden, U., An investigation of risk 
perception and risk propensity on the decision to 
continue a software development project. The 
Journal of Systems and Software, 2000. Vol. 53, pp 
145-157. 
[16] Sitkin, S.B. and L.R. Weingart, Determinants 
of risky decision-making behavior: A test of the 
mediating role of risk perceptions and risk 
propensity. Academy of Management Journal, 1995. 
38(6): p. 1573-1592. 
[17] Heemstra, F.J. and R.J. Kusters, Dealing with 
Risks: A Practical Approach. Journal of Information 
Technology, 1996. 11: p. 33-346. 
[18] Freedman, D.P. and G.M. Weinberg, Handbook 
of Walkthoughs, Inspections, and Technical Reviews 
- Evaluating Programs, Projects, and Products. 
1982, Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 
[19] Parnas, D. and P. Clements, A Rational Design 
Process: How and Why to Fake It. IEEE 
Transactions on Software Engineering, 1986. 12(2): 
p. 251-257. 
[20] Keil, M. and D. Robey, Turning Around 
troubled Software Projects:  An Exploratory Study 
of the Deescalation of Commitment to Failing 
Courses of Action. Journal of Management 
Information Systems, 1999. 15(4): p. 63-87. 
[21] Keil, M. and D. Robey, Blowing the Whistle on 
Troubled Software Projects. Communications of the 
ACM, 2001. 44(4): p. 87-93. 
[22] Sedor, L.M. and K. Kadous, The Efficacy of 
Third-Party Consultation in Preventing Managerial 
Escalation of Commitment: The Role of Mental 
Representations.  Contemporary Accounting 
Research, 2004. 21(1): p. 55-88. 
[23] Shadish, W.R., T.D. Cook, and D.T. Campell, 
Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for 
Generalized Causal Inference. 2002, Boston, New 
York: Houghton Mifflin Company. 
[24] Calder, B.J., L. Phillips, and A. Tybout, 
Designing Research for Application. Journal of 
Consumer Research, 1981. vol. 8, pp. 197-207. 
 
Appendix 1: Scenarios 
A.  Insider - Project Manager 
You are a project manager in the IT department 
of a leading regional bank, SouthBank. Based on 
your proposal, SouthBank initiated an IT project 
seven months ago called Bank Online to provide 
online banking services to its customers. Top 
management of your bank hopes Bank Online can 
help the bank remain competitive with other banks 
that are developing similar systems. Customers have 
expressed delight with the online banking concept, 
but they are concerned whether they can trust the 
bank's approach to handle the privacy and security 
issues. The bank has publicly announced that Bank 
Online will be available within the next month. 
You are currently the project manager for Bank 
Online. You recruited some of the most experienced 
personnel in the IT department to your project team. 
The team was excited that Bank Online is going to 
be the first Microsoft .NET system developed by the 
bank. A .NET expert was hired to assist your team 
on .NET related technical issues, but this expert is 
supporting multiple projects and isn't always 
available when your team needs him. 
Recent developments have drawn everyone's 
attention to the timing of Bank Online's release. 
Despite careful planning to meet project deadlines, 
you had to bring in extra staff which has caused 
project spending to exceed the budget by 25 percent. 
Despite this, the project still falls behind schedule 
by one month. Now, the development work has been 
completed and the project has entered into the 
testing phase. The testing team has identified that 
one of the key features, transferring funds, lacks the 
functionality originally specified. Based on this, the 
Executive committee of your bank has expressed 
concerns about the status of your project. 
Tomorrow morning, you must meet with the 
Executive Committee of your bank to recommend 
whether or not to proceed with launching Bank 
Online as scheduled. Based on your review of the 
project's status, you must recommend one of two 
possible courses of action. The first course of action 
is to intensify project activities and to launch Bank 
Online as previously scheduled. The second course 
of action is to initiate an investigation into the extent 
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10and nature of the problems and to delay the launch 
of Bank Online. Choosing the first course of action 
means that SouthBank risks launching a version of 
Bank Online that lacks critical functionality. 
Choosing the second course of action means that 
SouthBank risks being beaten to market by one or 
more competitors. 
 
B. Outsider - Independent Consultant 
You are an independent IS consultant with 
StarConsult. SouthBank, a leading regional bank, 
has hired you to audit its in-house IT project, Bank 
Online and to report the project's status to the bank's 
Executive committee. Bank Online was initiated to 
provide online banking services to the bank's 
customers. Bank Online is based on the proposal of 
a project manager of the bank's IT department. Top 
management of SouthBank hopes Bank Online can 
help the bank remain competitive with other banks 
that are developing similar systems. Customers have 
expressed delight with the online banking concept, 
but they are concerned whether they can trust the 
bank's approach to handle the privacy and security 
issues. The bank has publicly announced that Bank 
Online will be available within the next month. 
As an independent consultant to the project, you 
have been informed that the project manager 
recruited some of the most experienced personnel in 
the bank's IT department to the project team. The 
team was excited that Bank Online is going to be the 
first Microsoft .NET system developed by the bank. 
A .NET expert was hired to assist the project team 
on .NET related technical issues, but this expert is 
supporting multiple projects and isn't always 
available when the team needs him. 
You discovered some issues about the project as 
you were auditing it. Recent developments have 
drawn everyone's attention to the timing of Bank 
Online's release. Despite careful planning to meet 
project deadlines, the project manager had to bring 
in extra staff which has caused project spending to 
exceed the budget by 25 percent. Despite this, the 
project still falls behind schedule by one month. 
Now, the development work has been completed 
and the project has entered into the testing phase. 
The testing team has identified that one of the key 
features, transferring funds, lacks the functionality 
originally specified. Based on this, the Executive 
committee of the bank has expressed concerns about 
the status of the project. 
Tomorrow morning, you must meet with 
SouthBank's Executive Committee to offer your 
independent recommendation whether or not to 
proceed with launching Bank Online as scheduled. 
Based on your review of the project's status, you 
must recommend one of two possible courses of 
action. The first course of action is to intensify 
project activities and to launch Bank Online as 
previously scheduled. The second course of action is 
to initiate an investigation into the extent and nature 
of the problems and to delay the launch of Bank 
Online. Choosing the first course of action means 
that Southbank risks launching a version of Bank 
Online that lacks critical functionality. Choosing the 
second course of action means that SouthBank risks 
being beaten to market by one or more competitors. 
 
 
Appendix 2: Questionnaire 
A. With  checklist 
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C. Decision recommendation & role manipulation 
check 
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